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A B S T R A C T   
Inter-organizational collaboration is often considered essential to transboundary fishery governance, due, in part, 
to the high levels of task interdependence, the remote and often treacherous conditions, and the limited levels of 
information available to any policy actor on resource status. In the high seas, Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (RFMOs) are responsible for sustainably managing highly migratory and straddling fish stocks 
through the implementation of ecosystem-based approaches and ensuring adequate inter-jurisdictional cooper-
ation. A central question facing RFMO governance is therefore how to structure and sustain inter-organizational 
transboundary collaboration under high uncertainty? This paper presents the case of the North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organization (NASCO), conceptualized as a strategic alliance between the bureaucratic organiza-
tions responsible for north Atlantic salmon fishery management in the member countries. We identify and 
explain how dimensions of trust, control, and perceived risk have structured the collaborative performance of the 
alliance. The application of an integrated trust-control-risk framework increases conceptual clarity for how, 
when and why alliance managers might seek to develop different forms of trust through different management 
control systems in ways that further multi-actor collaborative network performance. Future research needs are 
identified, including better understanding how managerial strategies and control mechanisms facilitate inter- 
organizational trust in transboundary governance settings and mitigate the perceived risks of working together.   
1. Introduction  
“States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and man-
agement of living resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose 
nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living resources in 
the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the 
measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. 
They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional 
fisheries organizations to this end.”  
Article 118, United Nations Convention on Law of the Seas. 
Environmental change resulting from natural resource extraction 
and global climate change presents a significant transboundary gover-
nance challenge, not least for fisheries [63,13,71]. In the high seas,1 
where 34.2% of all fished species are considered overfished [24], 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs)2 are respon-
sible for sustainably managing marine living resources through the 
implementation of ecosystem-based approaches and ensuring adequate 
inter-jurisdictional cooperation [30,26,23]. RFMOs are international 
organizations (IOs) established by member states to coordinate their 
bureaucracies in an effort to realize collective outcomes, generally with 
the administrative support of an international treaty secretariat [31,73]. 
They are known to face many organizational challenges, with their 
* Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: jasper.devries@wur.nl (J.R. deVries).   
1 Areas beyond the 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) granted to coastal states under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) [62].  
2 Building from the UNCLOS and the subsequent UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), highly migratory and straddling fish stocks require international cooperation 
through sub-regional or regional fisheries management organizations, which can adopt legally binding conservation and management measures [18]. 
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effectiveness being regularly questioned [16,31]. Considerable research 
attention has subsequently been placed on evaluating the performance 
of RFMOs (see, for example, [14,23,32,62,65,26]) with issues related to 
transparency, participation, monitoring and data, management mea-
sures, compliance and decision-making being common themes [14,18, 
31,34,53]. Inter-organizational collaboration is often considered 
essential to transboundary fishery management, due, in part, to the high 
levels of task interdependence, the remote and often treacherous con-
ditions, and the limited levels of information available to any policy 
actor on the resource status. A central question facing RFMO governance 
is therefore how to structure and sustain inter-organizational trans-
boundary collaboration under high uncertainty? 
According to Pintassilgo et al. [66], highly migratory and straddling 
fish stocks (i.e., species that migrate between the high seas and the areas 
of national jurisdiction) can be regarded as common pool resources 
shared between RFMO members (and non-members), making the level 
of cooperation, participation and the stability of these organizations key 
to effectiveness (see also [18,62]). Managing common pool resources 
requires regular and ongoing inter-organizational communication in 
order for the actors involved to be able to understand, plan, coordinate 
and implement the work that requires collaboration [3,76]. Stern [76], 
considers collaboration to be “the most fruitful form of interaction 
leading to the greatest potential for long-lasting and resilient solutions to 
environmental problems”, enabling a broader array of ideas and stra-
tegies to be considered, the reduction of unproductive conflict, and the 
leveraging of resources (including social networks and capacity) to 
achieve goals, and enhance efficiency in the long term. We consider 
inter-organizational collaboration to involve varying degrees of 
networking (communication and information exchange for mutual 
benefit), coordination (aligning or altering activities to enhance effi-
ciency), and cooperation (sharing resources for achieving compatible 
goals) in a dynamic process though which entities “share information, 
resources and responsibilities to jointly plan, implement, and evaluate a 
program of activities to achieve a common goal” [11]. While it has been 
identified that management strategies, risk perceptions, and trust are all 
important to the inter-organizational collaborative performance of 
environmental IOs [46,72,80], there has been little-to-no research 
integrating these concepts in the study of transboundary marine fish-
eries generally, and RFMOs specifically. 
This paper presents the case of the North Atlantic Salmon Conser-
vation Organization (NASCO), an established IO that we conceptualize 
as a strategic alliance between the organizations responsible for salmon 
fisheries management in the member countries. Using an integrated 
trust-control-risk framework, we argue that NASCO’s historical devel-
opment as a treaty organization, and subsequent management as an 
alliance network, can be used to identify key attributes that affect the 
collaborative performance of the organizations involved in trans-
boundary fisheries management. 
2. International organizations as inter-organizational networks 
Studies on international political cooperation have previously 
highlighted the functional characteristic of international treaties, 
showing that they often develop in response to evolving scientific 
knowledge of environmental problems or changing problem definitions 
[20,33,47]. The resulting IOs have been shown to facilitate cooperation 
by: lowering transaction costs and providing monitoring when mutual 
gains are available through collaboration [41]; enabling the develop-
ment of coordinated focal points for negotiation when actors are con-
cerned about the distributional implications of cooperating [42,50]; and 
changing the ways that alliance members in the network understand 
problems [35]. While there has already been considerable scholarship 
on the political processes involved with the creation and function of IOs 
in different policy contexts [43], there has been less focus on the bu-
reaucrats and agencies involved in administering IOs, including secre-
tariates. This is surprising, given that recent research suggests they can 
have considerable influence in treaty implementation, shaping power 
relations between states through distributing and building capacity, 
framing problems and disseminating information used in decision--
making [40,73]. 
At the bureaucratic level of decision-making, IOs operate as inter- 
organizational networks [43]. According to Imperial [38], these net-
works involve a group of “organizations that form temporary or per-
manent alliances for a limited purpose or common area of involvement 
[1,2]”, where the “action set is oriented toward the collective activity of 
a group of organizations [2,49]”. Importantly, inter-organizational 
networks arise from individual participants being directed to represent 
their organizations and therefore only communicate in so far as indi-
vidual representatives communicate, share information and actively 
participate in the alliance [9]. Previous research has identified a special 
role for the organizations composed of other organizations that take a 
leadership role in coordinating collaborative activities, such as pooling 
resources, distributing tasks, and collectively making decisions [38], 
referring to them variably as network brokers [48], coalitions, alliances 
or strategic alliances [27–29], network administrative organizations 
[69] and/or collaborative organizations [38]. 
In this paper, we conceptualize RFMOs as a form of strategic alliance 
network [29], where an agreement is reached between at least two 
partner organizations that (a) they remain legally independent, (b) share 
benefits and managerial control over the performance of assigned tasks, 
and (c) make contributions in strategic areas [44,86]. In this “network” 
form of governance, action is deeply embedded in social networks3 of 
relationships, which in turn shape and define the precursors, processes, 
and outcomes associated with alliances [28,67]. Child and Faulkner 
[12] note that inter-organizational alliances “are often ‘strategic’ in the 
sense that they have been formed as a direct response to major gover-
nance challenges or opportunities which the partner firms face.” Ac-
cording to Delrue [19], an “alliance” is a relationship where the parties 
maintain autonomy but are inter-dependent to a non-trivial degree. As a 
result, partners in alliance relationships can be both cooperative and 
non-cooperative, which presents certain risks to collaborating and raises 
the importance of trust and control mechanisms when trying to under-
stand collaborative performance [17,19]. 
3. Trust, control and risk in inter-organizational alliance 
networks 
Previous research suggests that different dimensions of trust, control 
and risk interact in complex ways to affect the formation, governance 
structure and performance (ie., knowledge sharing and collaboration) of 
inter-organizational alliance networks [17], with implications for how 
organizations with strategic interdependencies work together [28]. Das 
and Teng [17] present an integrated framework of how trust and control 
are inextricably linked with risk in strategic alliances and how managing 
the different inter-relationships between these constructs enables orga-
nizations to effectively collaborate. They consider both control and trust 
to be primary antecedents of perceived risk, with all three constructs 
comprised of multiple dimensions (see Fig. 1). This conceptualization of 
the factors affecting inter-organizational collaboration within alliance 
networks offers a useful starting point for further exploring some of the 
social dynamics likely affecting transboundary fisheries governance 
networks. According to Das and Teng [17], if the perceived risks of 
collaborating are too great, actors within an alliance will refuse to 
collaborate on certain tasks, causing the alliance network to change 
shape or to fragment. Partners within alliance networks therefore 
employ different forms of control and willingness to trust, either jointly 
or separately, to manage and reduce their perceived total risk of 
3 “a set of nodes (e.g., persons, organizations) linked by a set of social re-
lationships (e.g., friendship, transfer of funds, overlapping membership) of a 
specified type” [45]: 458). 
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cooperating [17]. 
Perceived Risk: (or subjective risk) relates to the estimated proba-
bilities of several outcomes [17]. It concerns ‘risk taking in relationship’ 
in order to differentiate it from more general risk-taking behaviours 
because it can only occur in the context of a specific, identifiable rela-
tionship with another party [51]. It is particularly relevant to managing 
strategic alliances because of the uncertainty associated with coopera-
tion among partners [17]. Distinguishing between the different di-
mensions of perceived risk presented in Fig. 1 is essential because 
depending on which risk is perceived as being more of a threat, actors 
within an alliance will decide on strategies that can best acquire the 
resources they require from others while protecting their own - often 
reflected in the alliance structure [17]. Different forms of trust and 
control will be used by alliance partners to reduce the perceived prob-
ability and impact of undesirable outcomes, and, according to Das and 
Teng [17], there is no third determinant of comparable importance. 
Trust: is defined as the “psychological state in which one actor (the 
trustor) accepts some form of vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another (the trustee), 
despite inherent uncertainties in that expectation” [78] citing [54,70]. 
Within strategic alliance networks, trust is considered a key element in 
cooperative relationships, lessening concerns about opportunistic 
behaviour and reducing the need for formal control mechanisms [17,21, 
76]. Because trust is specific—in relation to the context, subject, and 
object of trust—the different dimensions presented in Fig. 1 are often 
inter-dependent, potentially existing along two non-exclusive spectra (a 
positive trust spectrum and a distrust spectrum) with different trust 
types fitting different niches and serving different functions at various 
stages in a collaborative management process [59,77]. 
Control: According to Das and Teng [17], control is about influencing 
the behaviour of alliance partners, in contrast to trust, which moderates 
risk perception without doing anything about the behaviour of the 
partner. Control mechanisms that are designed to moderate perceived 
risk can be formal or informal, relying on a level of trust to facilitate 
relationships [19]. Formal control (including behavioural and output 
controls) can undermine trust within collaborative networks because 
Fig. 1. Integrated framework of trust, control and risk in strategic alliance networks (adapted from [17]).  
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they reduce autonomy and create doubt about the goodwill of partners, 
while informal control (social control) is thought to increase trust [17]. 
Control is both an antecedent to, and output from, trust in interorgani-
zational networks [67], and can have both positive and negative impacts 
on collaboration. 
We apply these concepts to the case of NASCO, an inter- 
organizational fishery management alliance (i.e, RFMO) that has oper-
ated for over 35 years. We focus on the formation of the alliance, its 
governance structure, aspects of its dynamic evolution and explain some 
of the benefits of entering the alliance (as recommended by [28]). Our 
objective is to illustrate how different dimensions of Das and Teng’s [17] 
framework of trust, control, and perceived risk are relevant to trans-
boundary fishery management collaboration and change through time. 
4. Analytical approach 
We adopted an exploratory case study approach [85] utilizing doc-
uments (newspaper articles, publicly available reports, policy agree-
ments, academic research papers, websites) and archival records 
(memos, annual reports, meeting minutes, press releases) as sources of 
evidence. Exploratory case study research “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” [85], 
generating outputs that aim to provide a sharpened understanding of the 
situation, and what might be important for interest groups to look at in 
future research [74]. An exploratory approach was appropriate due to 
the lack of previous empirical research integrating different dimensions 
of trust, control and risk in transboundary fishery management [85]. 
Descriptive qualitative analysis consisted of “three concurrent flows of 
activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing / verifi-
cation” [52]. Data analysis was conducted using content analysis [5] and 
pattern-matching [52], guided by the integrated trust-control-risk 
framework presented in Fig. 1 [17]. The analytic strategy therefore 
relied on the theoretical propositions of the study and analyzing the 
evidence based on them, helping to focus attention on certain data and 
to ignore other data [85]. This required a restricted approach to content 
analysis, focussing on the propositions to be investigated and, in turn, 
the texts to be included as data [8]. 
There are limitations associated with the analysis, including reliance 
on secondary data sources and our desire to explore the potential of Das 
and Teng’s [17] conceptual framework to inform transboundary fish-
eries scholarship, which may have led to researcher bias when it comes 
to selecting relevant data. As noted by Strang and Wittrock [79], our 
results should be considered as offering only partial insight into an al-
ways more complex reality. We also acknowledge that our analytical 
method is limited to recorded communications that, when used alone, 
raises questions about validity and reliability [8] that will require future 
empirical research involving primary data to address. Nevertheless, as 
noted by Berg and Madsen [6] relying solely on secondary data is 
“arguably a pragmatic choice when given the multitude of challenges 
that researchers encounter when attempting to map the diffusion and 
evolution of management (accounting) concepts and ideas” (see also 
[79]). 
5. Case: The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization 
(NASCO) 
NASCO is a prominent RFMO dedicated to the restoration, conser-
vation, and management of wild Atlantic salmon (Salmo salar) in the 
North Atlantic region. The analysis focuses on the following questions: 
What characteristics of the relations between bureaucratic actors in-
fluence risk perception? How has trust (goodwill and competence) been 
developed within the alliance? What activities have increased or 
decreased actor perceptions of risk? What has influenced the choice of 
governance structure and what are the features of the control package(s) 
employed in the alliance? To explore these questions, we trace and 
explain the development of and interactions between members of the 
alliance over time using key events as examples. 
5.1. Background 
According to Bubier [10] managing and conserving Atlantic salmon 
is one of the most difficult tasks facing the political jurisdictions that the 
highly migratory fish encounters. Salmonids are a family of finfishes that 
spawn in freshwater and occupy the marine environment at later stages 
of their life history. Atlantic salmon deposit eggs, which are fertilized in 
select freshwater streams. Eggs develop into fry, then live in freshwater 
for up to four years before leaving their rivers of origin for the marine 
environment, where they experience drastic growth due to the abun-
dance of food in the marine system. Adults spend at least two years at 
sea, then return to their rivers of origin to spawn, with a small per-
centage not dying and returning to the marine environment to repeat the 
cycle [10]. The migration and distribution of Atlantic salmon covers 
thousands of kilometres, which sets them apart from other North 
Atlantic finfishes. Atlantic salmon from rivers in the Gulf of Maine and 
northward into Northern Quebec swim to feeding grounds in the waters 
around Greenland [4], as do salmon originating from the Barents Sea 
(see Fig. 2). As a result, Atlantic salmon are subject to a wide range of 
differing, and at times conflicting, management regimes over their 
five-to-six-year lifespan [10,83]. 
Salmon experience natural as well as fishing-based mortality, which 
in turn limits the number of individuals that may return to their rivers of 
origin [25]. More recently, the rapid expansion of aquaculture produc-
tion is further threatening wild salmon stocks through the genetic effects 
of farmed Atlantic salmon escaping and mortality from sea lice and 
diseases [57]. Beyond the need for appropriate siting of aquaculture 
facilities and associated sea lice control, reducing fishing pressure is 
considered one of the best ways to improve stock viability [36,39]. 
Overall population estimates of Atlantic salmon show that stocks have 
experienced declines since the 1970′s [61], with some individual stocks 
exhibiting stock sizes that are below, as well as above, spawning 
escapement reserves [36,39]. At the same time, catches of Atlantic 
salmon have steadily declined over the last fifty years. 
Recognizing the transboundary governance challenge, policy actors 
including recreational anglers, Indigenous resource users, fishery man-
agers, fisheries scientists, fisheries policymakers, conservationists, and 
industry representatives from the different jurisdictions impacting wild 
Atlantic salmon survival created working groups to coordinate infor-
mation collection and collective action, culminating in the signing of the 
Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North Atlantic Ocean 
in 1982, and subsequent establishment of the North Atlantic Salmon 
Conservation Organization (NASCO) in 1984 [81,83]. The Convention 
created a large, protected zone beyond the fisheries jurisdiction of the 
coastal states where Atlantic salmon fisheries were no longer allowed. It 
also prohibited salmon fishing in most areas within coastal state juris-
diction beyond 12 nautical miles from the coast [56]. Furthermore, it 
requires the Contracting Parties (the “Parties”) to provide regular re-
ports on salmon catches, to collect scientific data on stock status, and to 
provide to NASCO information on domestic management initiatives and 
regulatory measure implemented [81]. 
5.2. Structure and function of NASCO 
NASCO is an RFMO formed to contribute to the conservation, 
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restoration, enhancement, and rational management of salmon stocks 
throughout their migratory range while considering the best scientific 
evidence available through consultation and cooperation among actors 
[10,56]. It has six Contracting Parties: Canada, USA, Denmark (for 
Greenland and Faroe Islands), the EU, Norway and Russia. 
The primary forum for the exchange of information in support of 
coordination and cooperation among Parties is its Council, which su-
pervises the administrative and financial affairs of the organization, as 
well as managing external relations, communication among members 
and between members and non-members [56,81]. The criteria for 
participation in NASCO Council are set forth in the NASCO Handbook.4 
Each party is authorized to appoint no more than three representatives, 
who accompany experts and advisers, to NASCO Council. Given large 
interest among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the 
recognized value that NGOs can offer to NASCO’s mandate, in 1985, 
specific criteria were established to allow for NGO inclusion in meetings. 
Following a strategic review termed the “Next Steps” process in 2004, 
the relationship between the organization, the Parties and its stake-
holders became a greater focus, with the procedures for NGO partici-
pation expanded [56,81]. 
In addition to having a Council, a Secretariat, and a Research Board, 
NASCO also has four Commissions, which divide all organizational ac-
tivities into regions (Fig. 3). Each Commission consists of relevant Party 
member representatives, with each member having one vote. All de-
cisions taken by the Commissions must be unanimous, with the option 
for any Party to abstain in order for the proposal to go forward [10]. 
According to Bubier [10], this need for unanimous consent likely reflects 
the reality that NASCO, like other international treaties, lacks enforce-
ment power. Therefore, member states who object to measures are not 
bound by the decision-making outcome. 
Key to NASCO is the regular development of fisheries science and 
biological advice through the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Sea, or ICES. ICES, also an international organization, includes the 
Working Group on North Atlantic Salmon, or WGNAS. NASCO affiliates 
and their member states contribute to, and are informed by, the annual 
reports produced by members of the WGNAS. ICES and NASCO provide 
a high-level, intergovernmental structure to improve the understanding 
of wild salmon stocks and governance of salmon resources in the North 
Atlantic. While both organizations are responsible for disseminating 
scientific information or biological advice, NASCO provides the venue 
for transboundary fishery governance [81]. Since its establishment, 
NASCO has introduced significant changes to Atlantic salmon fisheries, 
including reductions in quotas, fishing effort and even closures [56,83, 
84], with most efforts to design and implement regulatory measures 
largely directed toward Greenland. NASCO and in particular the West 
Greenland Commission have identified the status and origin of salmon 
stocks at Greenland and affiliates have worked together to establish 
quotas to limit the catches of salmon [84]. In the inaugural year of 
NASCO, a catch quota of 870 tonnes was established, which has since 
been steadily reducing to just 30 tonnes in 2020. While NASCO’s initial 
focus was on regulating salmon fisheries in West Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, it has broadened its purview over time to include habitat 
protection and restoration, fishery management in States of origin and 
aquaculture [56,81]. 
5.3. Motivations for establishing NASCO 
The life history and distribution of Atlantic salmon stocks causes high 
levels of task interdependence between different agencies and necessi-
tates international communication and cooperation to ensure that 
salmon industries exist into the future [83]. As noted by Bubier [10], the 
salmon conservation measures in one country are only as effective as the 
corresponding measures in another. However the United States, Canada 
and European nations have no management control once the salmon 
have left their waters, resulting in a situation where so-called ‘states of 
origin’ are unable to unilaterally conserve their domestic salmon pop-
ulations [10]. 
The impetus of this emerging alliance network was to respond to the 
offshore salmon fishery developing along the coast of West Greenland in 
the 1960′s. A bilateral agreement in the 1970′s between the United 
States and Denmark, in recognition of its territorial jurisdiction over 
Greenland, represented the first step towards setting quotas and served 
to phase out high seas fishing by 1976. However, the agreement did not 
last and was terminated in 1980 due to the introduction of 200 nautical 
mile limits by most countries of the North Atlantic [83]. Realizing that 
bilateral agreements were insufficient for managing a species that 
travels through several coastal state waters, and in recognition of the 
lack of an organized response following the termination of the 1970′s 
agreement, the US State Department worked with interest groups and 
countries to draft a multilateral treaty (see [81]). While there was 
disagreement over the structure and authority of any proposed inter-
national organization designed to implement the treaty, a decentralized 
approach where authority rested in several sub-commissions was 
decided [10]. 
During the years leading up to NASCO’s formation, coastal states and 
their policy actors recognized their high levels of interdependence, 
Fig. 2. Migration routes of the North Atlantic salmon. Credit: Atlantic Salmon Federation, 2018.  
4 NASCO Handbook, NASCO, http://www.nasco.int/pdf/reports_other 
/NASCO_Handbook.pdf (accessed July 28, 2020). 
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causing them to seek collaboration on Atlantic salmon conservation and 
management [83,84]. Applying Das and Teng’s [17] framework, there 
are perceived risks associated with inter-organizational alliance forma-
tion, including relational and performance risks. An example of rela-
tional risk would be the likelihood and consequence of not having 
satisfactory cooperation among organizations in member states, in this 
case potentially resulting in goal conflict, high transaction costs, loss of 
autonomy or sovereignty and deviance from agreements. Performance 
risks are the likelihood and consequence that alliance objectives are not 
achieved despite satisfactory cooperation. In this case, performance risk 
is manifest as the potential to waste time and resources and associated 
opportunity costs. We expect the actual perceived risks of collaborating 
differ among the organizations involved, given that individual govern-
ments and NGOs have voiced concern about the risk of losing their local 
investments to manage, conserve, and improve salmon stocks when 
other coastal states enjoy the largest return on their investment [22]. 
Historic controversy on this point was leveled at Greenland and the 
Faroe Islands, whose coastal state economies derived revenue from 
salmon fisheries [75]. Coastal nations with large recreational or tradi-
tional fishery economies are known to have perceived their risks 
differently, with at least one NGO arguing that an objective approach 
that failed to account for varying stakeholder perceptions was why early 
NASCO agreements were unsuccessful [64]. 
Recognizing their high levels of interdependence, a situation 
amplified by the declining salmon stocks, ultimately led the Parties to 
ratify the Convention for the Conservation of Salmon in the North 
Atlantic Ocean [83], signaling a desire to cooperate and collaborate on 
management despite the perceived risks. Potential relational risks were 
initially addressed through the requirement to establish an international 
organization, NASCO, with a management mandate to facilitate 
“consultation and cooperation” among the organizations involved 
(behaviour controls). NASCO also has a mandate to ensure “the best sci-
entific evidence available” is used in decision-making which is pursued 
through output controls such as assessment reports and action plans (see 
[81]) in order to help mitigate performance risk (i.e., Proposition 4, 
Fig. 1). Preceding the signing of the treaty and subsequent establishment 
of NASCO was a necessary degree of trust among the member Parties to 
act in good faith, assessed based on their reputations for dealing fairly in 
previous transboundary resource management alliances (goodwill trust) 
and ability to contribute the necessary resources and expertise to ensure 
the alliance performs (competence trust), in this case potentially 
involving scientific evidence, funding, infrastructure, monitoring and 
enforcement capacity (ie., Propositions 1 and 2, Fig. 1). 
5.4. Managing the relationship 
The Convention is the underlying instrument facilitating the 
bureaucratic alliance and subsequent participation in NASCO activities. 
The Convention sets the mandate, budget as well as the limits of the 
international organization (output controls). It addresses who is repre-
sented and in what capacity (behaviour control), how decisions are taken 
and conflicts resolved (social control), how business is conducted, the 
transparency of proceedings, and who is allowed to observe (behaviour 
controls). Relationships among NASCO officers and representatives are 
maintained through regular correspondence with respective members of 
each Commission (e.g., North American Commission, West Greenland 
Commission) and through annual meetings (behaviour controls). Annual 
meetings also serve the purpose of social control, facilitating inter- 
organizational cultural blending [87] by creating a venue for sharing, 
discussing, and revising shared values and norms, including which kinds 
of scientific and regulatory activities should be prioritized [81]. Meet-
ings also serve as a venue for output control, facilitating goal convergence 
and the setting of shared objectives as the annual check-ins ensure that 
Parties’ agreed progress on activities is being satisfactorily met, and if 
not, that Parties have an opportunity to develop resolutions to any set-
backs encountered. NASCO’s careful documentation and archive of ac-
tivities ensures accountability and transparency. Examples include 
adjusting catch quotas to account for overharvest in a previous year 
[56], or revising a sampling program to account for new techniques or 
stocks [58]. 
The collaborative performance of an inter-organizational alliance 
depends heavily on the positive and negative feedback relationships 
existing between control and trust over time. For example, within the 
NASCO alliance, behaviour controls have been supplanted by competence 
trust, as individual representatives or organizations demonstrate the 
capacity to meet the given management objectives (in line with Propo-
sitions 2 and 9b). Varying forms of trust and control not only serve to 
substitute for each other in certain contexts; they also complement and 
reinforce each other in other contexts. For example, both goodwill and 
competence trust deepens with shared social controls (e.g., joint decision- 
making and dispute resolution processes, attendance at annual meet-
ings, scientific presentations and professional discussions, field excur-
sions, receptions, dinners and events) (see Proposition 7, Fig. 1), which 
then serves to enhance the effectiveness of all controls (Proposition 8, 
Fig. 3. Total reported nominal catch of Atlantic salmon (tonnes of round fresh weight in four North Atlantic regions 1960–2017. Credit: ICES WGNAS.  
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Fig. 1). Conversely, when agreed objectives are not meeting the expec-
tations of the alliance members, goodwill trust can become diminished 
and perceived relational risk can increase (Proposition 1, Fig. 1), which 
then needs to be supplanted by behaviour controls, issued and/or upheld 
by representatives of a given party (Propositions 3 and 5, Fig. 1), helping 
to repair goodwill trust with time (Proposition 8, Fig. 1). 
A good example of the dynamic interactions between varying forms 
of trust and control in reducing the perceived risks of participating to 
enhance the performance of the alliance is offered by recent discussions 
surrounding the desire to further reduce Greenland’s catch quota due to 
the risk of Atlantic salmon extirpation in the USA and Canada [36,39] 
(see Table 1). With mounting scientific evidence that the Atlantic 
salmon stocks were in decline, members of the West Greenland Com-
mission produced the Multi-Annual Regulatory Measure for Fishing for 
Salmon at West Greenland for 2015, 2016 and 2017 (WGC 15(21)), which 
set out 11 points of agreement, including but not limited to protocols for 
reporting salmon catches, protocols for sampling salmon, a defined 
salmon fishing season, and a salmon catch quota of no more than 45 
Table 1 
Trust, control and perceived risk framework applied to the example of Greenland’s Atlantic salmon quota reductions in 2018.  
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metric tonnes (behaviour controls). In reaching this agreement, NASCO 
members were not able to convince Greenland to further restrict its 
harvest of Atlantic salmon below 45 tonnes, despite the advice of sci-
entists, resulting in a loss of goodwill trust among the Parties being re-
ported in the media [15]. NGO’s subsequently played a leading role in 
expressing their frustration publicly, with the president of the Atlantic 
Salmon Federation stating: 
"A compromise would have been a subsistence fishery of no more than 20 
tonnes, but more than twice this amount is unacceptable… Greenland’s 
intent to harvest 45 tonnes each year from 2015 to 2017 will put our 
salmon at further risk" [15]. 
Questions then emerged about the efficacy of the management 
control mechanisms supporting the alliance objectives of NASCO. As 
noted by a biologist from the US National Marine Fisheries Service in 
2016 [82]: 
"We’ve tried everything possible to negotiate with Greenland to find al-
ternatives to find out how they can lessen impacts on U.S. fish… This is 
part of their culture, this is part of who they are, this is something they’ve 
always done. We are trying to work with them to realize the fish they are 
fishing for originate in Canada, in U.S. waters, in Europe, and these 
populations are in decline". 
For their part, the Government of Greenland disagreed that a halt to 
Inuit fishing would save the salmon population, with a spokesperson 
from the Ministry of Fisheries noting that Greenland has been continu-
ously reducing its salmon fishery for over twenty years with no 
improvement in the population’s status. This view suggests that perfor-
mance risk was becoming a major concern for the various Contracting 
Parties with decreasing competence trust challenging the performance of 
the alliance (Proposition 2, Fig. 1). For Greenland, the main domestic 
policy concern related to the importance of salmon fishing to the Inuit 
community, which comprise 90% of the total population, and who fish 
close to shore and solely for local use [82]: 
“Surviving off the resources that nature can offer has been the way that 
the tough Inuit of Greenland has survived for thousands of years, and it is 
still the way that a large part of the people survive today—and here the 
salmon plays a vital part of the history and culture”. 
This position is in line with the International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 169, also known as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
Convention (1989), a legally-binding international agreement protect-
ing the rights of Indigenous peoples, which was ratified by Denmark in 
1996, (and Norway in 1990), but has not been ratified by the other 
NASCO Parties (2021). In response to the inability of the Contracting 
Parties to negotiate a significant further reduction in Greenland’s 
salmon quota through the behaviour and social controls outlined in the 
Convention and the competence and goodwill trust developed over the 
30 + years since the Convention was ratified, NASCO-observing salmon 
conservation organizations became more active in the design, imple-
mentation, and revision of agreements among Party members, including 
the ASF NASF International Conservation Agreement; and, the Multi-annual 
Regulatory Measure for fishing for Salmon in West Greenland (WGC(18) 
11). 
The Multi-annual Regulatory Measure for fishing for Salmon in West 
Greenland (WGC(18)11), herein referred to as the 2018 Regulatory 
Agreement set out 13 points of agreement, including but not limited to:  
• A continued ban on exports of salmon catches  
• A catch quota of 30 metric tons  
• A defined salmon fishing season  
• Protocols for collecting and verifying fishery catch data  
• Reporting standards for salmon catches  
• Licensing requirements  
• Protocols for sampling salmon for stock assessment purposes 
This Agreement was subsequently implemented into the Executive 
Order for Fishery after salmon in 2018, and demonstrates how NASCO as a 
strategic alliance helped to facilitate multilateral action on the man-
agement of salmon. Goodwill trust was further restored when the Atlantic 
Salmon Federation and the North Atlantic Salmon Fund in Iceland (both 
NGOs with NASCO observer status) reached a 12-year agreement with 
the Greenland association of hunters and fishers, Kalaallit Nunaanni 
Aalisartut Piniartullu Kattuffiat (KNAPK), to stop commercial fishing of 
wild salmon. The president of the Atlantic Salmon Federation described 
the agreement as a win for transboundary resource management: "It’s a 
huge win for wild Atlantic salmon, particularly in Canada… In a given year 
75 or 80 per cent of salmon caught in Greenland are of Canadian origin" 
[37]. 
The deal was structured around using funds from private donors and 
conservation bodies, with no money provided by government agencies. 
These funds were provided to KNAPK through the ASF NASF Agreement, 
with the goal of augmenting the effectiveness of the 2018 Regulatory 
Agreement. Funds were used to incentivize fishers to invest in gear to 
participate in other fisheries, thus taking pressure off salmon. That 
KNAPK would agree to such a deal is a change of course, given that the 
organization has in recent years supported commercial fishing as a 
means of Greenland utilizing its own resources [55]. 
However, in 2019 Greenland’s Ministry of Fisheries, Hunting and 
Agriculture reported that the 2018 Atlantic salmon harvest off the 
country’s west coast was 40.3 tonnes, more than double the 20-tonne 
subsistence quota agreed to by KNAPK [7] damaging goodwill and 
competence trust between the organizational actors, and pointing to the 
need for further control mechanisms to be explored. In response to this 
conservation set-back, an Atlantic Salmon Federation spokesperson 
responded that: “It came as a great disappointment… We certainly have a 
duty to the people who support us and donate generously to make this 
possible… Everyone is keen to come back in year two of this agreement and do 
better” [7]. 
The current (2020) Agreement includes private and confidential 
compensation schemes for satisfactory performance, essentially forming 
a voluntary environmental program (VEP) designed to induce positive 
environmental externalities beyond the requirements of government 
legislation [68]. Funds provided to KNAPK are earmarked for distribu-
tion among Greenlandic fishers to invest in equipment or gear for tar-
geting species other than salmon. Granted funds are also earmarked for 
conservation education, as well as for actions that improve the moni-
toring and reporting of the agreed upon catch quota (performance con-
trols). The ASF NASF Agreement also signals the support of the 
Government of Greenland (output control) and establishes that satisfac-
tory progress toward upholding the terms of the Agreement will be made 
known through NASCO meetings and the information produced by the 
West Greenland Commission each year, social controls designed to 
mitigate performance risk and enhance competence trust. 
5.5. Strategic benefits of the alliance 
Increased levels of inter-organizational interaction, coordination, 
cooperation and ultimately collaboration are a significant benefit of 
NASCO [83,84], helping to navigate the complexity of Atlantic salmon 
conservation and facilitating task division, thereby enhancing both 
goodwill and competence trust among network members. Examples of 
tasks include organizing transboundary scientific research, engaging 
with traditional knowledge systems, conducting impact and stocking 
assessments, and the monitoring, management and enforcement of 
agreed fishery resource management plans, sometimes in remote and 
treacherous conditions (see [13]). Another benefit of the alliance has 
been the opportunity to engage national and international NGOs in the 
management discussions (behavioural and social control) and also in 
support of the shared ecosystem-based management objectives (output 
control). While NGOs are not formally voting members of NASCO, their 
role in facilitating competence trust among the Parties and expanding the 
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control mechanisms available to the alliance beyond the institutions of 
government at key junctures appear to have mitigated performance risk 
and enhanced collaboration (Proposition 2, Fig. 1). As noted by the 
Chairman of NASCO’s NGOs 1997–2012, “The NGOs have worked suc-
cessfully together with NASCO Parties to facilitate much greater transparency 
in its work, notably the requirement for each jurisdiction to produce an 
implementation plan which now creates public accountability for wild salmon 
management around the North Atlantic. Close co-operation and constructive 
criticism are essential to help implement both vital research and practical 
salmon management measures aimed at conserving and restoring this iconic 
species.” 
Key, but less well understood, is the extent to which the bureaucratic 
alliance has enabled the development of informal management social 
control mechanisms. These controls can serve to enhance the goodwill 
and competence trust among member organizations (Proposition 7, 
Fig. 1), and include annual meetings with associated receptions, dinner 
events, field tours, and opportunities for cultural exchange through 
reciprocated travel opportunities and joint research expeditions. A 
recent example includes the 2018 Salmon summit in Portland, Maine at 
the Gulf of Maine Research Institute, where the latest research on 
salmon stocks was shared amidst discussions about the 2018 regulatory 
agreements. While the interactions between perceived risk, trust and 
control within the inter-organizational alliance appear to be supporting 
collaborative transboundary fishery governance, it is worth noting that 
the north Atlantic salmon populations have continued to decline since 
the establishment of NASCO, suggesting a need to expand the policy 
boundaries of ecosystem-based fishery management (see also [81]). 
Indeed, the External Review of NASCO [56] identified a need for NASCO 
to “consider other activities with a significant impact on the environmental 
status of these habitats of concern. In the rivers of the Parties, one of the main 
concerns has been dam building and the barring of access for salmon to 
spawning grounds. Other impacts of concern include aquaculture, in-
troductions and transfers and transgenics” in order to meet the objectives 
of the Convention. This is another example where the formal engage-
ment of NGOs and local communities is likely to be beneficial to 
furthering the shared objectives (output control) of the alliance. 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
To better understand the inter-organizational factors affecting 
collaborative fishery management network performance and offer pol-
icy insights of relevance to transboundary resource management, we 
explored how the different organizations involved in NASCO draw on 
trust and control to mitigate perceived risk of collaboration. 
Using Das and Teng’s [17] integrated framework, our analysis 
highlights how different dimensions of control and trust can serve 
different purposes while also interacting in complex ways to support the 
collaborative relationship among inter-organizational alliance members 
at different points in time. Table 2 summarizes the results of the analysis, 
showing the roles played by different forms of trust and control in 
reducing the perceived risks of engaging in inter-organizational alliance 
relationships. We recognize that these results are coarse and would 
benefit from further empirical work to expand on the various mecha-
nisms being used by network managers to support inter-organizational 
collaboration on transboundary resource management, however, we 
believe that the potential value of the framework to decision-makers is 
visible. In particular, our analysis shows that the application of an in-
tegrated trust-control-risk framework can increase conceptual clarity for 
how, when and why network managers might seek to develop different 
forms of trust through diverse management control systems in ways that 
further multi-actor collaborative network performance. While a large 
and growing number of studies have already identified different di-
mensions of trust as being key to developing inter-organizational goal 
convergence and collaboration in natural resource management (see for 
example [46,72,76,78,80]), none have empirically examined the dy-
namic relationships between different dimensions of trust and control, 
and their roles in mitigating perceived risks of inter-organizational 
collaboration in RFMOs. Our exploratory case of NASCO offers a first 
step towards an expanded conceptualization of the role that trust plays 
in collaborative network governance in transboundary fishery settings 
and suggests that further research is warranted. In particular, there is a 
need to better understand how the managerial strategies and control 
mechanisms presented in Table 2 facilitate inter-organizational trust in 
RFMOs and mitigate the perceived risks of working together [46]. The 
effects of the control mechanisms commonly used in transboundary 
fishery networks (e.g., stocking assessments, interagency strategic vision 
statements, action plans, decision structures, incentives for informal 
interaction, etc.) are generally under-researched in the context of un-
derstanding trust and collaboration dynamics through time. Moreover, 
as noted by Nielsen [59], it is also important to understand the recursive 
nature of trust development over time, for example as organizations 
make changes to their aspirations and realign their goals the roles of 
trust may change, with different dimensions acting as both a determi-
nant and a feature of the relationship. The framework presented in Fig. 1 
provides a useful starting point from which we can begin to tackle the 
multi-level and multi-directional roles that different types of trust and 
control play in different phases of an inter-organizational collaborative 
relationship [60]. 
Our analysis also shows how NGO involvement in the alliance has 
grown through time as new relational and performance risks emerged 
and goodwill and competence trust were needed. The example of the 
ASF NASF Agreement in 2018 nicely demonstrates the ways that NGOs 
were able to act in a pragmatic and entrepreneurial manner to imple-
ment supplementary performance and behavioural controls, while also 
building competence and goodwill trust within the alliance (see 
Table 1). As such, although NGOs are not formal member Parties to the 
Convention, meaning their actions were officially considered beyond the 
activities of NASCO, their involvement has greatly supported the 
collaborative performance of the alliance (see also [65]). This is an area 
that warrants further policy consideration in the context of trans-
boundary fisheries governance, where the creation of formal mecha-
nisms to include communities and NGOs may serve to enhance the 
Table 2 
Risk reduction through trust building and control mechanisms in a trans-
boundary fishery alliance (adapted from [17]).   
Applicability to Perceived Risk of 
Collaborating 




Goodwill trust-building   
Establishing mutual interests X  
Individual and team-level trust X  
Joint dispute resolution X  
Competence trust-building   
Proactive information collection  X 
Joint scientific research  X 
Behaviour control mechanisms   
Policies and procedures X  
Transparency and inclusivity X X 
Reporting structures X  
Staffing and training X X 
Quotas and catch reporting  X 
Annual meetings X  
Output control mechanisms   
Setting goals and objectives  X 
Setting system boundaries  X 
Monitoring and assessment  X 
Reporting and meeting presentations X X 
Planning and budgeting  X 
Social control mechanisms   
Decision-making process X X 
Joint dispute resolution X X 
Meetings, events, field excursions X  
Ritual, ceremonies and networking X   
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performance of the bureaucratic alliance (see also [18]). While one 
could imagine that the perceived relational and performance risks 
among the different organizations involved may initially be higher, the 
potential for effective control mechanisms and different forms of trust to 
co-develop through time appears likely to counteract these concerns 
when task interdependence is high. In the case of NASCO, NGOs have 
increasingly been recognized as facilitating transparency and account-
ability in the performance and output controls being used within the 
alliance, such as offering input on fish sampling programs, offering 
monetary incentives to the in-country fishers association KNAPK, 
enhancing competence trust and reducing performance risk. This 
recognition is relevant to other RFMOs [18], suggesting that identifying 
and including potentially interested NGOs and local rightsholders early 
in the process of alliance formation, and engaging them fully in the 
transboundary policy discussions, scientific assessment reporting pro-
cesses and (in)formal meeting events can accelerate collaborative per-
formance of the alliance and, ultimately, increase the likelihood of 
ecosystem-based fishery management objectives being realized over 
time. 
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